Justice Handler's Concurrence in Dale v. Boy Scouts of
Americm A Morality Tale
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For more than two decades, Justice Handler was the conscience
of the New Jersey Supreme Court. He wrote some of the Court's
most compelling decisions expanding protections for individual
rights under the state constitution,' yet he insisted upon principled
standards for invoking the state constitution as an independent
source of individual rights surpassing those guaranteed under the
United States Constitution. To the end, Justice Handler remained
the Court's lone voice in opposition to the death penalty on state
constitutional grounds,' yet he was entrusted with the solemn,
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See State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 568, 423 A.2d 615, 633 (1980) (finding that the
regulations of a private university violated a defendant's state constitutional rights by
"evicting him and securing his arrest for distributing political literature upon its
campus").
See State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 359, 450 A.2d 952, 962 (1982) (Handler, J.,
concurring) (writing separately to "explain more fully the judicial principles which..
• underlie the salutary resort to state constitutions as a fountainhead of individual
rights"). For cases in which the Court resorted to the state constitution to protect
individual rights, see, for examples, State v. Smith, 155 N.J. 83, 100, 713 A.2d 1033,
1042 (1998) (holding that under the state constitution, police did not have probable
cause to search a defendant and to seize his keys), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 576 (1998);
State v. Mollica, 114 N.J. 329, 335, 554 A.2d 1315, 1318 (1989) (holding that "state
constitutional [protections] against unreasonable search and seizure applie[d] to
[protect] an individual's hotel telephone billing records based on his or her use of a
hotel-room telephone"); State v. Wlliams, 93 NJ. 39, 48, 459 A.2d 641, 645 (1983)
(holding that the state constitution protected the right of the general public and the
press to be present during criminal pretrial proceedings); Schmid, 84 N.J. at 568, 23
A.2d at 633 (finding that regulations of a private university violated a defendant's
state constitutional rights by "evicting him and securing his arrest for distributing
political literature upon its campus").
s See State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 344, 524 A.2d 188, 300 (1987) (Handler, J.,
dissenting) (dissenting from the majority's decision to uphold the death penalty
under the New Jersey Constitution because the majority "fail[ed] to meet the
challenge to vindicate individual rights, and squander[ed] the opportunity to
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sobering responsibility of hiring and supervising the Court's law
clerks who focused exclusively on death penalty appeals.
Justice Handler gave us many such memorable moments, but
one of his finest came at the close of his distinguished tenure. In his
concurrence in Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, he reminded us of both
how far we have come in combating invidious discrimination and
how far we still have to go. His stirring words also spoke volumes
about his personal journey as ajurist.
In Dale, the Court unanimously ruled that New Jersey's Law
Against Discrimination' (LAD) prohibited the Boy Scouts of America
"from expelling a member solely because he [was] an avowed
homosexual."6 This was the first time that the New Jersey Supreme
Court had addressed the LAD's 1991 amendment prohibiting
discrimination based on "affectional or sexual orientation."7
While joining in the unanimous Dale opinion, Justice Handler
filed a separate concurrence specifically to rebuke the trial court for
"impermissibly
invok[ing]
stereotypical
assumptions
about
8
homosexuals." The Justice elaborated:
One particular stereotype that we renounce today is that
homosexuals are inherently immoral. That myth is repudiated by
decades of social science data that convincingly establish that
being homosexual does not, in itself, derogate from one's ability
to participate in and contribute responsibly and positively to
society.... Like stereotypes about an individual based on sex or
race, similar assumptions about a lesbian or gay man are false and
unfounded, and reveal nothing about that individual's moral
character, or any other aspect of his or her personality[.] 9
Justice Handler added: "In short, a lesbian or gay person, merely
because he or she is a homosexual, is no more or less likely to be
deepen our understanding of the Constitution"); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 73,
524 A.2d 130, 161 (1987) (Handler, J., dissenting) (dissenting from the majority's
ruling to uphold death penalty under the New Jersey Constitution because "state
constitutional principles place the highest value on individual life and require the
greatest protections when life itself is at stake").
160 N.J. 562, 734 A.2d 1196 (1999), cert.
granted, No. 99-699, 2000 WL 21144
(U.S. Jan. 14, 2000). The United States Supreme Court recently granted certiorari
on the question of whether this application of New Jersey's Law Against
Discrimination (LAD) would violate the Boy Scouts of America's federal
constitutional rights of free speech and association under the First Amendment. See
id.
SN.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-1 to -49 (West 1999).
6 Dale, 160 N.J. at 570, 734 A.2d
at 1200.
Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 1999)).
8 Id. at 649, 734 A.2d at 1243 (Handler,J., concurring).
9 Id. at 647, 734 A.2d at 1242-43 (Handler,J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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moral than a person who is a heterosexual.""° The Justice then
concluded:
Stereotypes cannot be invoked to extend the meaning of selfidentifying expression of one's own sexual orientation, and
thereby become a vehicle for discrimination against homosexuals.
Such stereotypes, baseless assumptions, and unsupported
generalizations reflecting a discredited view of homosexuality as
criminal, immoral and improper are discordant with current law
and public policy. Accordingly, they cannot serve to define
contemporary social mores and morality.
Justice Handler was compelled to send this powerful message to
future generations because he realized that our state courts will
increasingly be called upon to define the civil and constitutional
rights of homosexuals. The federal courts have yet to recognize the
same level of protection for this minority group as they have for many
other minority groups."2 For this reason, it will necessarily become
the responsibility of state courts to review such issues under their own
state constitutions and, where applicable, antidiscrimination laws.
10 Id. at 647, 734 A.2d at 1243 (Handler,J., concurring).

11 Id. at 651, 734 A.2d at 1245 (Handler,J., concurring).
See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986) (holding that there is no
fundamental right for "homosexuals to engage in sodomy" under substantive due
process); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 263 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that the First
Amendment is not violated by using service member's declaration of homosexuality
as evidence of engaging in conduct inconsistent with military activity); Ben-Shalom v.
Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding that regulations that discriminate
against homosexuals are only entitled to a rational basis standard of review because
homosexual conduct may constitutionally be criminalized); Dronenburg v. Zech, 741
F.2d 1388, 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that constitutional rights of equal
protection and privacy are not violated by the Navy's policy requiring discharge for
homosexual conduct); Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1123-24 (C.D. Cal.
1980) (rejecting a claim under both federal and Colorado law that two men were
married for the purposes of immigration status), afd, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982);
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney of Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1203 (E.D. Va.
1975) (upholding the constitutionality of a Virginia statute that criminalized
sodomy), afftd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976). But see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623, 624
(1996) (holding that an amendment to the Colorado Constitution that prohibited
"all legislative, executive[,] or judicial action at any level of state or local government
designed to protect" homosexuals violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court recently granted
certiorari in the Dale case on the issue of whether the Boy Scouts of America have a
First Amendment right to bar homosexuals from membership in that organization.
See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 160 N.J. 562, 734 A.2d 1196 (1999), cert. granted, No.
99-699, 2000 WL 21144 (U.S.Jan. 14, 2000).
Of further note, in 1996, Congress enacted, and President Clinton signed into
law, the Defense of Marriage Act, which provides that no state is required to
recognize same-sex marriages sanctioned by another state. See Pub. L. No. 104-199,
110 Stat. 2419 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C).
12
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Through his impassioned plea in Dale,Justice Handler was also
undoubtedly anticipating a momentous issue to come-whether
same-sex couples should have the right to marry or to receive the
same benefits afforded married couples under state law. Although
Justice Handler did not make any specific reference to that issue in
his Daleconcurrence, he wrote on that subject
more than twenty years
3
earlier as ajudge of the appellate division.
In M.T. v.JT.,4 a postoperative transsexual married a man but
later filed for support and maintenance. The husband argued that
his transsexual wife was really a male, so the marriage was void as an
illegal same-sex marriage.
The appellate division held that a
postoperative transsexual was "female" for marital purposes and that
her husband therefore had a legal obligation to support her. Writing
for the Court, Justice Handler noted, in dicta, that the New Jersey
marriage statute did not permit same-sex marriage.
The Justice
acknowledged that the statute did not contain any "explicit
references to a requirement that marriage must be between a man
and a woman[,]" but reasoned that the "statutory condition [of
heterosexuality] must be extrapolated. It is so strongly and firmly
implied from a full reading of the statutes that a different legislative
intent, one which would sanction a marriage between persons of the
same sex, cannot be fathomed."16 Justice Handler concluded: "We
accept-and it is not disputed-as the fundamental premise in this
case that a lawful marriage requires the performance of a ceremonial
marriage of two persons of the opposite sex, a male and a female."'
More than two decades later, the same jurist who once could not
"fathom" same-sex marriage has admonished us to "renounce" the
"archaic" "stereotype" that "homosexuals are inherently immoral.1 8
3

See M.T.v.J.T., 140 N.J. Super. 77, 355 A.2d 204 (App. Div. 1976).

4 140 N.J. Super. 77, 355 A.2d 204 (App. Div. 1976).

5 See id. at 84, 355 A.2d at 207 (noting that there is "almost universal" agreement
that a "heterosexual union is... the only one entitled to legal recognition" and
"[t]here is not the slightest doubt that New Jersey follows the overwhelming
authority").
16 Id. at 84-85, 355 A.2d at
208.
17 Id. at 83, 355 A.2d
at 207.
19Dale, 160 N.J. at 647, 650, 734 A.2d at 1242, 1244 (Handler, J., concurring).
The very "stereotype" to which Justice Handler referred, however, has pervaded the
many court opinions that have rejected constitutional challenges by same-sex couples
seeking to marry. See, e.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 331 (D.C.
1995) (holding that "same-sex marriage [is] not a 'fundamental right' protected by
the due process clause" because same-sex marriage is not "'deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition'" and because the status of marriage as a fundamental
right is based on its link to procreation) (citation omitted); Adams v. Howerton, 486
F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (rejecting a claim under both federal and
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Even accepting Justice Handler's interpretation of the New
Jersey marriage statute in M.T.,' 9 his conversion in Dale begs the
question whether that law discriminates against same-sex couples
under the LAD and violates their due process and equal protection
rights under the state constitution." The highest courts of two other
states have already addressed that issue under their state
constitutions.
First, in Baehr v. Letin2 (Baehr ]), the Hawaii Supreme Court, in
a plurality opinion, held that Hawaii's marriage statute, as applied to
bar same-sex couples from marrying, was presumptively
unconstitutional under the Hawaii State Constitution 2 In the wake
of Baehr I, Hawaii's voters passed a state constitutional amendment,
proposed by both houses of Hawaii's legislature, to grant the
legislature the authority to reserve marriage to only opposite-sex
couples.2s On that basis, late last year, the Hawaii Supreme Court
ruled that Hawaii's marriage statute was now entitled to be given "full
force and effect," regardless of "whether or not in the past it was
violative of the equal protection clause" of the Hawaii State
Constitution." Accordingly, the Court remanded the case for entry
Colorado law that two men were married for the purposes of immigration status
partly because it would violate federal public policy that views "propagation of the
race" as a basic concept of marriage making same-sex marriage "impossible and
unthinkable"), affd, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187,
1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (holding that the trial court's denial of marriage license
to two males did not violate the Eighth, Ninth, or Fourteenth Amendments partly
because "marriage is so clearly related to the public interest in affording a favorable
environment for the growth of children"); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589
(Ky. Ct. App. 1973) (upholding the trial court's refusal to allow two women to a
obtain marriage license because the very definition of marriage requires two people
of the opposite sex, and "marriage has always been considered as the union of a man
and a woman"); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971) (prohibiting
same-sex couples from marrying because marriage is "a union of man and woman,
uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of children within a family, [and] is
as old as the book of Genesis"). Cf. In re Estate of Cooper, 187 A.D.2d 128, 133-34
(N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (refusing to give the surviving partner of a long-term
homosexual relationship a right of election under decedent's will based on a
definition of marriage as a "historic institution [that] is more deeply founded than
the asserted contemporary concept of marriage and societal interests for which
petitioners contend").
19 See Rutgers Council of AAUP Chapters v. Rutgers, The State Univ., 298 NJ.
Super. 442, 455-56, 689 A.2d 828, 834-35 (App. Div. 1997) (citing Justice Handler's
dicta in M.T. with approval), cert. denied, 153 N.J. 48, 707 A.2d 151 (1998).
20 See NJ. CONsT. art. I, 1 1; NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-1 to -49 (West
1999).
21 852 P.2d 44 (Haw.
1993).
2
See id. at 67.
23 Baehr v. Miike, No. 20371, 1999 Haw. LEXIS 391, at *5 (Haw. Dec. 9, 1999).
24 Id. at *6, 7.
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ofjudgment dismissing it.29
In contrast, in Baker v. State,' also decided late last year, the
Vermont Supreme Court unanimously held that under the Common
Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution, same-sex couples
may not be deprived of the statutory benefits and protections
afforded persons of the opposite sex who choose to marry. We
hold that the State is constitutionally required to extend to samesex couples the common benefits and protections that flow from
marriage under Vermont law. Whether this ultimately takes the
form of inclusion within the marriage laws themselves or a
parallel "domestic partnership" system or some equivalent
statutory alternative, rests with the Legislature. Whatever system
is chosen, however, must conform with the constitutional
imperative to afford all Vermonters the common benefit,
protection, and security of the law.2
In a separate concurring opinion in Baker, one of the Justices
wanted to go even further.9 The Justice was prepared to order entry
of an injunction requiring the state to give the same-sex couples
marriage licenses.29
The majority would not take that leap,
concluding, instead, that "the State is constitutionally required to
extend to same-sex couples the common benefits and protections
that flow from marriage under Vermont Law. That the State could
do so through a marriage license is obvious. But it is not required to
do so[.] "m
Will New Jersey be the next great battleground in the
constitutional wars over the rights of same-sex couples to marry?
With its long tradition of safeguarding individual rights under its
state constitution,31 its statutory protections under the LAD against
See id. at *8.
No. 98-032, 1999 WL 1211709 (Vt. Dec. 20, 1999).

2

Id. at *1.

See id. at *29 (Johnson,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

29

See id.

Id. at 18.
31 See, e.g., Davis v. NewJersey Dep't of Law and
Pub. Safety, Div. of State Police,
No. L4)02229-97, 1999 WL 1267750, at *15 (N.J. Super. Ct. July 7, 1999) (applying
the NewJersey Constitution to racial discrimination action); State v. Pierce, 136 N.J.
184, 209, 642 A.2d 947, 960 (1994) (noting that the NewJersey Constitution "affords
greater protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than the federal
Constitution affords"); State v. Hempele, 120 N.J. 182, 223, 576 A.2d 793, 814 (1990)
(holding that warrantless searches of garbage bags left on the curb violate the New
Jersey Constitution); State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 159, 519 A.2d 820, 857 (1987)
(using the New Jersey Constitution to reject the federal "good faith" exception to
search warrants issued without probable cause); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J.
287, 293, 450 A.2d 925, 928 (1982) (analyzing abortion funding under the New
30
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discrimination based on "affectional or sexual orientation" in "any
place of public accommodation," 2 and its recent recognition of
adoptions by same-sex partners," New Jersey would seem an
appropriate jurisdiction for mounting such a legal challenge. In that
event, the Court will do well to recall Justice Handler's words in Dale
that "[a] homosexual orientation tells nothing reliable about abilities

Jersey Constitution); State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 227, 440 A.2d 1311, 1319 (1981)
(concerning standing to challenge the validity of a car search); State v. Schmid, 84
N.J. 535, 568, 23 A.2d 615, 633 (1980) (finding that regulations of a private university
violated a defendant's state constitutional rights by "evicting him and securing his
arrest for distributing political literature upon its campus"); State v. Ercolano, 79 N.J.
25, 29-30, 397 A.2d 1062, 1064 (1979) (upholding privacy-based freedom from
"unreasonable searches and seizures"); State v. Tropea, 78 N.J. 309, 313-16, 394 A.2d
355, 357-58 (1978) (addressing double jeopardy and fundamental fairness); State v.
Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 216-17, 381 A.2d 333, 341 (1977) (concerning the right of
sexual privacy); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 19-20, 40-41, 355 A.2d 647, 652, 663-64
(1976) (analyzing the right of choice to terminate life support systems as an aspect of
the right to privacy under state constitution); King v. South Jersey Nat'l Bank, 66 N.J.
161, 177, 330 A.2d 1, 10 (1974) ("The power of the Court to enforce rights by the
New Jersey Constitution, even in the complete absence of implementing legislation,
is clear."); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 482, 508-09, 303 A.2d 273, 277, 291-92
(1973) (finding that equal protection under the NewJersey Constitution accorded a
right to education).
32 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 1999); see also Dale v. Boy
Scouts of Am., 160 N.J.
562, 589-94, 734 A.2d 1196, 1210-13 (1999) (finding that Boy Scouts of America is a
place of public accommodation due to various factors, including its various locations,
its openness to the public, and its close relationship with federal and state
government bodies), cert. granted, No. 99-699, 2000 WL 21144 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2000);
Frank v. Ivy Club, 120 N.J. 73, 104, 576 A.2d 241, 257 (1990) (holding that Princeton
University eating clubs are places of "public accommodation" and, therefore, were
prohibited from denying membership to women on the basis of their sex); Hinfey v.
Matawan Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 77 N.J. 514, 523-24, 391 A.2d 899, 903-04 (1978)
(finding a public school to be a place of "public accommodation" and therefore
covered under antidiscrimination laws); NOW, Essex County Chapter v. Little
League Baseball, Inc., 127 N.J. Super. 522, 531, 318 A.2d 33, 37 (App. Div. 1974)
(finding that a Little League baseball organization is a public accommodation
because "[t]he statutory noun 'place' . . . is a term of convenience, not of
limitation"), af'd, 67 N.J. 320, 338 A.2d 198 (1974); Fraser v. Robin Dee Day Camp,
44 N.J. 480, 487, 210 A.2d 208, 212 (1965) (finding a day camp to be a place of
public accommodation that could not discriminate on the basis of race).
Given the NewJersey Supreme Court's broad interpretation of what constitutes
a "place of public accommodation," a public office that issues marriage licenses
could be deemed a "place of public accommodation" subject to the LAD provisions
prohibiting discrimination based on "affectional or sexual orientation."
S See In reAdoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 285 N.J. Super. 1, 7-8, 12, 666
A.2d 535, 538, 541 (App. Div. 1995) (finding that a biological mother's same-sex
partner could adopt the biological mother's children without terminating the
biological mother's parental rights and that the adoption was in the children's best
interests); In re Adoption of Child byJ.M.G., 267 N.J. Super. 622, 625, 632 A.2d 550,
551 (Ch. Div. 1993) (holding that the adoption of child by a biological mother's
lesbian partner was in child's best interests).
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or commitments in work, religon, politics, personal and social
relationships, or social activities."
Justice Handler will be remembered for many great opinions.
His Dale concurrence should be among them. It is a morality tale
about how even to this day, in our courts and in the court of public
opinion, "stereotypes" and "myths" continue to cloud how we see and
treat one another. That is a life lesson learned over many years on
the bench and imparted as parting wisdom by the conscience of the
NewJersey Supreme Court.

3

Dale, 160 N.J. at 647, 734 A.2d at 1243.

